Frequent interlocutor philosopher asks, “what will — or should — the coalition look like on the American political right, to replace/displace the one that is in the process of completely melting down?”
How timely, as the New York Times just ran an article name-checking a bunch of conservatives agreeing that the coalition needs to be reinvented. To reiterate, the post-WWII right has been comprised of foreign policy hawks, social conservatives, and fiscal conservatives. These groups ended up on the Right in reaction to the development of the Left, and in such a position of opposition, they found strength. Once in power, they strayed too far from their strongest arguments, a devolution I examined in a previous post.
Among the foreign policy crowd, the so-called neo-conservatives and ‘National Greatness’ conservatives captured the ear of George W. Bush. The foreign policy realists were marginalized, and the Republicans in Congress, think tanks, and the media fell into lockstep. It’s obvious how well this has worked out. The nomination of John McCain extends their grip on the party’s foreign policy, but there is hope that this will not last beyond November. For starters, the power of the neo-conservatives within the Bush Administration has waned, and it looks like the realists are pushing foreign policy back into the “sane” category. Given a few more election cycles, and, probably, a hapless Democratic foreign policy that begs for the kind of rhetoric George Bush threw around in 2000, the realists might once again be calling the shots. Given how pliable members of the party and the punditry are, I don’t think it will be a huge leap to convince everyone in the coalition that we have always been at war with Eastasia, not Eurasia it is ok to build our foreign policy on something other than wishful thinking. Unfortunately, I believe the whole concept of the GWOT, a conceit at odds with reality, is too popular to be dropped; it will continue to pervert American foreign policy.
Social conservatives will still be a player in the coalition, but I think their role will be greatly reduced. I’m sympathetic to the arguments that they never held much real influence. The establishment GOP could get away with pandering to them and occasionally providing large, symbolic acts (e.g., Terri Schiavo), but never let them too close to the levers of power. As the country grows less socially conservative, they will be fewer in number, with all that that implies. They have also grown more fragmented, with some social conservatives wanting to tackle novel issues like global poverty and the environment. The right-wing coalition may either adapt to these desires or sacrifice members.
Fiscal conservatives are poised for a renaissance. Having powered welfare reform and tax-cuts, they have since stripped their gears grinding against spending. Only the pitiful and misguided Porkbusters whir on. With the coming election, we are likely to see a huge expansion in wasteful and, more importantly, ultimately unpopular spending. I’m thinking in particular of national healthcare. Without disputing the wisdom of any particular scheme, I’ll retreat to the safer ground of predicting that whatever comes out of the Democratic sausage-factory is unlikely to be as efficient and desirable as what liberals like to point to in other countries. As usual, government is going to screw this up. And when they do, it will be left to fiscal conservatives to come up with the solutions. Which is not to say that these solutions will be implemented, only that this will give fiscal conservatives a seat at the right-wing table. Currently, they don’t seem to be too welcome; once the crisis has passed, they may be disdained of again.
The reformed right-wing coalition will still include the same three broad categories of conservatives, but the content and emphases within those categories will change. The coalition will be, as it was during its latter-20th-Century ascendance, more reactionary. I’m not convinced by various proposals to restock the GOP policy cabinet with sober, centrist issues. These are issues for which there are either existing Democratic constituencies or for which there are no constituencies at all. The Right is stuck with the same three-legged stool.
“Hope” is not a plan for ending neoconservatism’s hold on the foreign policy establishment. Despite the dire economic consequences, the fact that potential war with Iran still looms on the horizon indicates that the neocons have not gone away, and likely have no intention of going away any time soon. Says neocon godfather Irving Kristol on the role of neoconservatives: “to convert the Republican party, and conservatism in general, against their wills.” Claes G. Ryn, in an interesting 2005 article in The American Conservative called “A Jacobin in Chief Exporting the French Revolution to the world” describes these ideologues as neo-Jacobins:
“After the implosion of the Soviet Union, the neo-Jacobin neoconservatives argued that America should use its status as the lone superpower to spread its principles. They demanded ‘moral clarity’ in U.S. foreign policy. Good stood against evil. After 9/11, Bush became their chief spokesman. He committed the United States to what he calls ‘the global democratic revolution.’ The war against Iraq, he said, was ‘the first step’ in that revolution. There has been not even a hint in the president
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Thanks Zach! (And thanks also for the links to the NYT and Reason articles, which I hadn’t yet seen.) I’m sympathetic to a lot of what you say here, but there seem to me a couple of important pieces missing:
(i) the hard-core nativist populists on immigration – these folks aren’t going anywhere, and they may well end up costing McCain the presidency. But it’s not clear that they can be integrated into the rest of the coalition, without utterly losing the Hispanic vote and, for that matter, a lot of the business support that the GOP has historically been able to count on.
(ii) the tax-cuts-for-tax-cuts-sake crowd – I don’t think that this counts as fiscal _conservatism_, but there’s an important single-issue constituency that only cares about getting taxes cut. It’s not clear how the actually fiscal conservative factions can get along with these guys, with taxes already so low and deficits already pretty high.
In reverse order, I think that the tax-cuts-for-tax-cuts-sake crowd, admittedly not fiscal conservatives, could largely be co-opted/distracted by a fight against a huge, wasteful spending program.
Nativism probably does constitute a separate constituency, but it can be viewed through three lenses. Foreign policy hawks can play up the border security issue; if Juan can make it over, so can Osama. Social conservative oppose mass immigration on a meta level; culture changes if it is infused with millions of people who have, well, a different culture. Fiscal conservatives worry, wrongly, about the economic impact of immigrants, usually through their drain on social services — though business interests and libertarians are notable exceptions. It may take a generation or two to allay all of these fears.
I’m really not sure how the coalition will react to immigration in the future.
Good post, Zach.
Zach, you’re more optimistic than I am about a fiscal conservative renaissance. The supply siders (”tax-cuts-for-tax-cuts-sake crowd”) really don’t care much about deficits, I’m afraid. But I hope you’re right that spending overreach by a Democrat will help them see the light.