In the Agora: Haidt and Libertarians

October 05, 2007

Haidt and Libertarians

Where do libertarians fit in Haidt's moral calculus? Andrew Sullivan posts a graph showing the scores of self-described libertarians who've taken the YourMorals test. They side with the liberals on the group concerns, and yet, confounding expectations, they side with the conservatives on the individual concerns. Overall, they score rather low on all dimensions of morality, a bit troubling for an ideology that considers itself principled.

I think it is because the logic of libertarian, or really simply market, economics is poorly reflected in Haidt's morality. Part of the reason is that economics is positive as well as normative, so some stances probably do not require any morality other than the conviction to be realistic. For the majority of issues, though, libertarians, liberals, and populists all make moral cases for their differences over economic policy. Haidt does explain the liberals and populists, but which axis supports economic freedom?

The absence of a clear answer does not reveal the im- or amorality of libertarianism, but rather the limits of Haidt's research. He and his colleague base their insights on cross-cultural surveys of morality, interpreted in light of cultural evolution. Those insights necessarily reflect the history of morality, not its future. According to this logic, moral sentiments will be contingent on social progression.

The sophisticated study of economics has occurred relatively recently in human history, as has the rise of classical liberalism. Could this be the emergence of a sixth dimension of morality? Arnold Kling summarizes the novelty:

Steven Pinker, a professor of cognitive psychology at MIT, points out that it is natural to resist economic reasoning. One of the chapters of Pinker's recent book, The Blank Slate, is called "Out of Our Depths." In this chapter, Pinker describes certain fields where the knowledge that we have acquired is challenging for cognitive faculties that were designed for prehistoric hunters and gatherers. One of these difficult fields is economics.

Pinker cites the work of anthropologist Alan Fiske, who has found that all interpersonal transactions can be sorted into four relational models.
Communal Sharing
Authority Ranking
Equality Matching
Market Pricing
In a Communal Sharing transaction, such as a family dinner, every member of the relationship is entitled to share in what is available.

In an Authority Ranking transaction, such as a decision made in a traditional corporation, there is a linear hierarchy, with people lower in the hierarchy deferring to those who are higher up.

In an Equality Matching transaction, such as taking turns going through a four-way stop, people operate according to an intuitive sense of balance and fairness.

In a Market Pricing transaction, such as buying a used car, people make decisions on the basis of calculating costs and benefits.

Of course, it is the Market Pricing mode of interacting that is studied in economics. However, Market Pricing requires techniques and thought processes that have not always been available to mankind. As Pinker points out,
Market Pricing is absent in hunter-gatherer societies, and we know it played no role in our evolutionary history because it relies on technologies like writing, money, and formal mathematics, which appeared only recently.
--p.234

The parallels between Haidt and the relational models are striking -- except Haidt does not accommodate the fourth. And just as liberal have difficulties understanding conservatives, liberals and populists have difficulties understanding libertarians, often attributing their views to unsavory motives (as Kling goes on to elaborate). To be clear, some do understand the market reasoning; they just happen to prioritize other concerns above economic freedom. But if we are to use Haidt to explain misunderstandings, Pinker may fruitfully be included in our diagnostic.

Or maybe libertarians are just flattering themselves that they represent the next stage in human evolution.

Posted by Zach Wendling at October 5, 2007 07:23 AM

Comments

"In an Equality Matching transaction, such as taking turns going through a four-way stop, people operate according to an intuitive sense of balance and fairness"

Not to get on a rant about driving or anything, but...no. At a four way stop you're supposed to operate according to the right-of-way laws of the jurisdiction you're in, not "an intuitive sense of balance and fairness". Here's an example from the CA driver's handbook (see "Intersections" - http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/hdbk/pgs16thru17.htm .

Posted by: J at October 5, 2007 08:56 AM | permalink

On the previous Haidt post, I commented that the five moral foundations actually appeared to me to have another dimension - specifically, that it illustrated relationships from tangible to abstract. The most tangible relationships are represented by the purity foundation, and the least tangible, most abstract relationships are represented by the harm foundation.

So if you consider abstract reasoning and perception to be "higher" than mere material perception of tangible things, then libertarians have almost completely left behind the thumb-sucking, anally-fixated values of "purity." To me, such values represent a relationship with the world as mentally isolated as that of a baby playing in a crib.

Posted by: Phil at October 5, 2007 10:13 AM | permalink

When I took the test after Zach's previous post on this subject, I had a fairly low score on the purity-valuing component. I expected this, because I don't think that disgust generally has anything to do with morality. However, in defense of people with higher purity-valuing scores, I want to point out that all you have done in this comment is compare them to babies (twice) and reference the anus. You also seem to be using a different definition of the purity value than the one that Haidt offers.

Posted by: Karl at October 5, 2007 12:17 PM | permalink

Seconding Karl, I'd also note that there's something more than a little off in your taking the harm factor -- which involves an immediate, visceral reaction to the perceived suffering of another, in a way that is continuous with the affect systems of many other mammals -- to be the _more_ abstract than purity, which often involves a fairly abstruse understanding of sexual mores. (Since, e.g., sex-between-married-people has a radically different purity status than sex-between-unmarried people.)

Posted by: philosopher at October 6, 2007 07:13 PM | permalink

nice site ;)

Posted by: minik peri at October 8, 2007 07:16 AM | permalink

I don't think that the "immediate, visceral reaction to the perceived suffering of another" is what is described in the "harm" foundation. That's a good point, though -- if all the "harm" foundation turns out to be is the instinctive motherly instinct to protect babies and old people then it's not particularly abstract.

My understanding of the harm foundation, though is that it's much more abstract. It's not about simply perceiving harm (as in watching harm occur and being disturbed by it), but about putting oneself in the shoes, and head, of another, and abstractly identifying with them, such that a harm to their interests matters in your calculus of right and wrong.

Posted by: Phil at October 8, 2007 11:07 AM | permalink

October 05, 2007

Haidt and Libertarians

Comments

Post a comment