Iraq: Time to Go
Four years ago, only intractable pacifists were calling for a withdrawal of forces from Iraq, and as the occupation has dragged on, that strategy still remains at the fringes of acceptable discourse. The conventional wisdom has been that the costs of a withdrawal far outweigh the pain of staying. At best, the suggestion that we should leave has politely been considered Plan Z. But now that Plans A through W have failed, it looks as if we are approaching the point where it is time to start talking seriously about “redeployment.”
Of course, many opponents of the war have been doing that for quite some time, but mostly on principle. Two recent pieces, however, argue for withdrawal as a practical matter. Robert Dreyfuss, writing in the Washington Monthly, argues that we have good reasons to expect that the dangers aren’t as great as previously supposed and even finds reason to be optimistic that leaving may have a salutary effect. In a compelling Cato Institute Policy Analysis, Ted Galen Carpenter is even more thorough, detailing why the costs of leaving are much less than the costs of other strategies. Neither piece makes a definitive case, but they do point out the most important points for considering a withdrawal. As the surge crests, we’ll know what to look for when plotting our next move. As even the stay-put Economist says, the Cato piece is a must read.
I would advocate for a withdrawal except for one large objection: the prospect of an anarchic Iraq drawing its neighbors into a regional war (Carpenter aptly describes every key player’s interests and abilities before dismissing the threat). Besides the human misery of expanded conflict, the global recession likely to ensue from a war in the oily Mideast would have unimaginable long term consequences. The only silver lining would be an increased impetus to decrease our reliance on fossil fuels (though I can scarce conceive of a worse way to internalize externalities than a shooting war).
Another nagging question is our moral obligation to the Iraqis. Carpenter rightly brings up a point often overlooked by the hawks: we also have a moral obligation to American soldiers and citizens. But what of the Iraqis who have bravely fought and worked with us? A recent 60 Minutes segment focused on thousands of refugees who assisted the coalition in their attempts to rebuild the shattered nation — and our national disgrace of abandoning them. If we withdraw, we absolutely must implement a policy of granting asylum to those individuals and their families who risked their lives and livelihoods for their country. How can we do anything less?
7 Responses to “Iraq: Time to Go”
I have a few minor quibbles with your post, Zach.
Four years ago, only intractable pacifists were calling for a withdrawal of forces from Iraq,
I don’t believe that was the case. I recall reading a number of CIA analysts and military people who thought an invasion of Iraq was foolhardy — certainly Bush Sr and Brent Scocroft thought it was, they even said so in their book, A World Transformed: “”Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq,…would have incurred incalculable human and political costs…We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well…Going in and occupying Iraq,
thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.’s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an
occupying power in a bitterly hostile land.”
I would also be hesitant to apply the word “pacifist” to the many Democrats who opposed the Iraq invasion, but who, like me, supported the Afghanistan invasion.
I would advocate for a withdrawal except for one large objection: the prospect of an anarchic Iraq drawing its neighbors into a regional war
One thing that I have heard repeatedly from military that no matter when we leave Iraq, now or in 15 years, the likely result will be bloody chaos, as all the various Iraqi players scramble to fill the power vacuum. That is inevitable. What will also be inevitable is meddling by the various regional players. What has become very obvious however, is that none of them appear to relish a regional sectarian war. Whenever we leave, we will have to tackle that inevitability, but it can only be managed by withdrawing carefully while simultaneously pursuing intense diplomacy/horse trading.
A side note: You might want to check out Seymour Hersh’s latest piece in the New Yorker. He alleges that an Iran-Contra style operation is being run out of the vice-president’s office to supply American and Saudi $$$ for supplying weapons to Saudi-sponsored Jihadists to carry on a covert war against Iran and Hezbollah. (I also read about the operation on Steve Clemons’ blog, the Washington Note and on Josh landis’ blog, SyriaComment prior to Hersh’s piece. Both posts were related to Saudi ambassador Turki’s abrupt resignation and his battles with Prince bandar on how to deal with a rising Iran – Turki was for negotiation, Bandar Cheneyesque).
Anyway, it’s not enough that Cheney and Elliot Abrams didn’t learn the lesson of 1980’s Afghanistan (the creation of Bin Laden/al-Qaeda), their operation would also appear to heat up the region further and possibly hinder any attempts at regional diplomacy when the time comes for us to withdraw from Iraq.
JohnS, I think you are making a common error in failing to distinguish between a pacific position before the invasion (we shouldn’t go in) and shortly after the invasion (we ought to withdraw immediately). Plenty of people who said we shouldn’t have invaded in the first place also, after the occupation, accepted the premise that leaving would be bad.
You got me there. I stand corrected.
And you are also correct that withdrawl back then remained at the fringes of acceptable discourse — thanks to fearful Democrats, a right-of-center Washington Foreign policy establishment, and a compliant USA press corpse. There were exceptions, Sen Robert Byrd called for it back in 2003 as did Ibelieve, Sen Feingold. Various academics were calling for and outling plans for how to do it in 2003, and Kofi Annan asked the White House for a withdrawl “timetable” that year.
Good summary on the state of this issue, Zach.
It’s nice to know that there are reasons to believe that withdrawal might not lead to chaos in Iraq which cripples the global oil-based economy, but the sheer magnitude of that negative outcome makes it a “third rail” issue.
Nice post. I wish we saw more people pushing for broad asylum (and permanent immigration) for Iraqis displaced by the war.
The Romans used nearby subjugated peoples to recruit new troops to fight the barbarians.
How will anyone in the world ever trust us as an ally when we are virtually guaranteed to cut and run when the going gets tough? I think that cost would swing the scales away from complete withdraw.
On the other hand, I think there is a Third Way. We withdraw behind our Hadrian’s wall, the friendly Kurds to the north. After they become an American protectorate, there will be a base to do business in the region. Also, any Iraqi who helped us in Gulf War II could be extended an invitation to live in Kurdistan.
Compromise could be negotiated with the Turks, and Iran would be saddened to see an American base being constructed on their border.
Also, any Iraqi who helped us in Gulf War II could be extended an invitation to live in Kurdistan.
Will the Kurds have a say in that? If we are extending invitations to people, shouldn’t we be inviting them to live on our land, not someone elses?