One thing I've learned is to not "collectivize" in my thoughts. It's about individual salvation. I have learned so much from direct messages from The Holy Spirit on The Holy Inheritance blog. Only individuals can listen inside and do as told by the Voice of the Holy Spirit.

Sounds a lot like the Roman Empire to me. They built roads and aqueducts which benefited populations they conquered, and brought "Pax Romana" to a lot of places formerly full of tribal warfare. And Rome lasted a lot longer than America is likely to.

" Anti-Americanism, therefore, can be seen as analogous to criticisms of government within democratic societies."

Um, except that anti-Americanism is more complicated than that--and it's odd that Mandelbaum doesn't address (or, actually, I don't recall him having done so; I read the article when it came out) the fact that anti-Americanism in its mainstream forms in the developed world, and much of the freer developing world, appears most virulent when 1) and 2) are most blatantly violated. Indeed, 2) is explicitly something that the administration (and, of course, any administration) disavows, while 1) is something that is often at the heart of international disputes.

(Anti-Americanism of the fringe variety--among radical Islamists, say, or unreconstructed Communists, deep ecologists, or Chomskyites--is purely ideological, and thus can't be defeated by facts.)

Mandelbaum also doesn't take seriously enough those accounts of the American world order which highlight the Cold War-era benefits that accrued to Washington from behaviors he portrays as more altruistic than anyone could seriously accept. Would Washington have been as kindly or as engaged in world affairs if the First World War hadn't ruptured the European-led world order? It's highly doubtful--just as it's doubtful that Washington would have been as attentive to Europe or as interventionist in Asia after the Second World War had the Soviet Union been (capable of being) more restrained.

Expanding part of my comment above, I should note that if we take Mandelbaum seriously, then 3) implies that the United States' legitimacy as "leader of the free world"--and, thus, the acceptability to the rest of the world of our holding a monopoly on power and seeking to prevent others from rivaling our hegemony--is tremendously important. It also implies that the United States' continuing failure to grapple with global issues (economic development, the small-arms trade, global warming, and the other issues we leave to the Europeans) is an even more significant failure than we usually admit to ourselves, because we are the country with the power--and hence the responsibility--to force progress on those issues.

Less seriously, Mandelbaum's argument resurrects a question Art Buchwald once jokingly asked: why not have foreigners vote for president? The question contains a kernel of truth; the Romans understood the importance of granting citizenship to the inhabitants of territories they conquered. (Furthermore, some sort of constitutional revision to favor the more cosmopolitan areas and citizens among us--double votes for people who speak a second language? for people who have and use a passport?--might be in order.)

Paul,

Clearly, you interpreted the aim of the article much differently than I did.

First, Mandelbaum did not attempt to offer a rigorous explanation of anti-Americanism. The analogy was a loose one which I think was intended to convey the idea that some criticism of the US is inevitable, given our status as the "world's government."

Secondly, when Mandelbaum wrote of the accessibility of the US government to foreigners, he did not mean any kind of nefarious activities. He was simply referring to the fact that foreigners can (attempt to) influence US policy through many avenues, such as the State Department, individual Senators or Congressmen, think tanks, etc. Compare that to the access that foreigners have to, for instance, North Korea or Iran.

Thirdly, Mandelbaum certainly did not assign altruistic motives to Washington. As in the paragraph I quoted, he recognized that the US has acted according to its own interests, but many of those actions also serve the interests of others.

Finally, I did not think Mandelbaum was arguing for the legitimacy of America's position in the world, per se. He was explaining why, given that hegemony and abundant criticisms of it, there have been no efforts by other states to oppose America's influence.

I've reread the article, and I'm still convinced that Mandelbaum's treatment is too superficial. (Reviewers of the book from which the FP article was drawn have noted, for instance, that even in the longer exposition of his argument, he refuses to deal with how the war in Iraq has strained the United States' credibility and weakened its legitimacy.)

Mandelbaum may not actually believe that altruism is a major force in American foreign policy, but based on the account he presents in his article, we're left with major questions. Why is it, for example, that the United States hasn't intervened abroad as often as it has? Why is it that other countries tend to see the U.S. as acting in their interest (or close enough to it that the challenge of organizing against the U.S. is too much of a bother)? Why do some regimes--not just the traditional rogue states, either--balk at U.S. demands and act contrary to U.S. interests? (Chavez, I'm looking at you.) Nor does Mandelbaum seriously treat the question dynamically. Will the rise of powers that are less Western and less free than the U.S. challenge its role as a global hegemon? (Berlin may grudgingly accede to U.S. leadership, but in twenty years China may not.) Could U.S. policies force a shift in other countries' perceptions of whether Washington is, indeed, serving their interests--or merely its own?

Finally, you've misunderstood my point about how 2) will be resisted by any American government. When the question is phrased directly ("Should foreign governments have a decisive influence in U.S. policymaking?"), it is almost sure to be rejected (although there will be exceptions). This blog has seen several debates over whether American courts should accept foreign precedents as potentially instructive; were the question to be phrased as I have above, I have no doubt that all of ITA's contributors would be strongly against allowing foreign governments anything more than the ability to parley with Washington. And this, by the way, is not a particularly unique feature of American governance: most democratic governments are, in fact, if anything more open to foreign persuasion than the United States (consider, for instance, the 25 members of the EU, plus the candidate countries who aspire to join). Yes, Washington is tremendously more open than Iran or North Korea, but so what? Surely that's not the standard that's appropriate.

No, I wouldn't say that as long as we're more open than Iran or North Korea, we're sufficiently open. But we are open enough to assuage other free nations which are affected by our hegemony.

I agree with you, however, that Mandelbaum's article is not a comprehensive analysis of America's foreign relations.

The question isn't whether the account is comprehensive; it's whether it is accurate and useful. I doubt it's either.

Hmm... To me it was very convincing (especially regarding Western democracies, but still more true than not for all nations), but I know for a fact that you and I approached the article with vastly different perspectives and background--and your knowledge of foreign affairs is much deeper and broader than mine. I'm also not sure what you mean by "useful," but it's probably not worth getting that deep into it.

Well, looking at what I wrote, I think I *was* too harsh--sorry: I should have considered, indeed, that what seems--not basic, exactly, but intermediate--to me isn't so to others. And having had the experience of teaching my grandmother to suck eggs (or teaching economists about supply and demand...), I retract my harshest comments. MM still could have been more searching, but this sort of article is, really, much, much closer to what I think public debate about international relations should be than what it often is ("They hate us because of freedom!!!!" "They hate us because of Israel!!!!1!!!").