You seem to be arguing against a bit of a straw man: who is proposing "a paradigm in which only non-state actors matter"? Granted, there are plenty of people arguing that non-state actors now matter more and more, but this is not exactly the same as saying states don't matter at all.

I agree with you that the rise of transnational NGOs do not by themselves erode national sovereignty: indeed, many NGOs have organized precisely to lobby for greater national control over national economies, and greater regulation of trade at the state level.

So states clearly do still matter. But how much they matter has to be decided on a case by case basis. You clearly point this out, but on the other hand, I'm not sure I agree with the thrust of your last few lines. You say that because states are "major movers" in the current headlines, our foreign policy ought to be primarily organized around them. Wouldn't that be just as short-sighted as it was to say that because NGOs were in the headlines in November 1999, at the "Battle of Seattle," states have gone the way of the buffalo?

It is a bit of a straw man, I'll admit, and clearly both NGOs in the normal sense and non-state actors in the broader (but more accurate) sense of including transnational corporations, wealthy and influential individuals, and religious organizations should be included; in addition, international and transnational phenomena like ideologies and information flows, population movements and familial connections, and -- most critically from a security perspective -- environmental and public health considerations should receive due attention. In many ways, frankly, these multinational phenomena (as distinct from the actors who affect and are affected by them) are more important than states--Carville's remark about wanting to be reincarnated as the bond market "because then I could intimidate everybody!" springs to mind, as does the obvious importance of the Internet for creating intense, transient and influential modes for shaping opinion.

Yet at the same time the structure of global politics created, maintained, and largely administered by states and state-supported entities (the UN, NATO, ASEAN, APEC and OPEC, etc) is the most visible way in which these phenomena are reified; they also form the spaces in which NGOs and other non-state actors make their cases. (We in the liberal democracies don't notice how accomodating our polities are to NGOs, but I suspect it's rather easier to gather information about hate crimes in Manhattan than Myanmar.)

The scope for state action has narrowed dramatically in the past fifty or so years, and the "regular" state--the Denmarks and Australias of the world--almost certainly have less freedom of movement than the class of state actors, because it is largely the most influential states that have the greatest freedom. Foreign policy must deal with this reality. Simultaneously, though, we also have to recognize that the very limiting of the scope of state freedom of action takes place within a political framework that makes political tools themselves less capable of exerting influence--that is to say, it's very hard to send an ambassador to a transnational phenomenon. So the elements of our foreign policy conduct have to be based on states, because they are the primary levers through which we can exert our own influence.

Really, though, I'm addressing my remarks in the post to people who conceive of the world as having three actors: The United States, terrorists, and Governments That Don't Matter. This is not a widely-shared view in the academy, but it is rather more widely held in the parts of the news-consuming public that see international affairs as a battle between good and evil. So it is not entirely a straw man after all, unless I am badly misreading the normal WND columnist.

The scope for state action has narrowed dramatically in the past fifty or so years, and the "regular" state--the Denmarks and Australias of the world--almost certainly have less freedom of movement than the class of state actors, because it is largely the most influential states that have the greatest freedom.

This is true. It is so true that one might even imagine that most states don't really matter, fundamentally. Only a few do. When it comes to solving the big problems facing the world, only a few entities are up to the challenge. Fifty years ago, it became apparent that the traditional-sized states of Europe--including Britain--could not solve those problems. Larger units that controlled continents began to really matter. For a long time, only two such units existed: the United States and the Soviet Union. The latter has ceased to exist, so the US happens to be a state and happens to be the most powerful actor. However, when other continent-sized entities come of age, we may indeed face the risk of a multipolar world (I am among those who believe that a concert-of-superstates scenario is ultimately bad for the world when compared to the hegemony of a liberal empire). So what is our task? Install controls on the political economy of the world while we have the ability to do so. Thus, when the world consists of superstates only, they won't matter as much as the liberal controls put in place by the original superstate--the United States.

Of course U.S. vital interests still matter. But U.S. ideals are still playing a much larger role in U.S. foreign policy, especially with respect to the Middle East, than they did previously.

In any case, with the Bush foreign policy, you're beginning to see a fusion of the two, making the old TR vs. Wilson or realpolitik vs. idealism dichotomies outdated.

Most people I've talked to from the Middle East can't understand why we have abandoned our ideals. If what you say is true, Kreliav, the administration has a long way to go before everyone else catches on.

Yes, Jason. However, I was referring to policy at it is made by actual policymakers in the United States. Perhaps there are many different perceptions on how well U.S. ideals are reflected in our foreign policies, but I would suggest that the perception of the people who know U.S. history, make U.S. policy, and aren't informed exclusively by monopolistic state-sponsored media are the most relevant.

These people are indeed most relevant--if what you want is to get the most accurate historical assessment of the events. But if you want to win a propaganda war (which is an essential part of what we're doing), then you have got to beat the state-run media at their own game. So far we hardly seem to be trying.